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 Ick-Hyun Nam**
We study a model in which a linear city of length 1 exists along the abscissa of a line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1), and 
consumers are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this interval. There are two firms which sell a kind 
of goods. Firm 1’s goods are valued s1 to the consumers, and firm 2’s goods have intrinsic value of s2. A 
consumer purchase one unit of goods if he chooses to do so. We define two kinds of differentiation. One is 
the differentiation in the location of each firm. Each firm can locate at a point x. The other differentiation 
is in the product’s value to customers. For this differentiation, each firm may try to increase the intrinsic 
value of its product compared with other firm’s products. In our model, this differentiation in product value 
is assumed to be given such that firm 1 offers higher value than firm 2 (s1 > s2). A consumer has to suffer a 
quadratic transportation cost in addition to the price in order to buy a product from a firm. We first study 
the duopoly competition of two firms which are located at each extreme end of the linear city. And then we 
deal with the location problem.
Keyword: Hotelling model, location model, differentiation, Nash equilibrium, price competition, 
Bertrand competition
I. Introduction
We consider a model (originally due to Hotelling [1929]) in which a linear city of length 
1 exists along the abscissa of a line (0≤x≤1), and consumers are uniformly distributed with 
density 1 along this interval. There are two firms which produce distinct and substitute 
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goods. Firm 1’s goods are valued s1 to the consumers, and firm 2’s goods have intrinsic value 
of s2. The goods of each firm are the same except the intrinsic values to the consumers, and 
we assume s1 > s2. This is the same situation as firm 1 has competitive advantage of lower 
unit production cost of s1 – s2 compared with firm 2 for homogeneous products. Or s1 > 
s2 may represent the difference in quality level even though the products serve the same 
function to the consumers. A consumer purchase one unit of goods if he chooses to do so. 
We assume that (s1, s2) are sufficiently large such that all consumers in the linear city purchase 
a unit. That is, we assume the whole market is covered by either of the firms.
We define two kinds of differentiation. One is the differentiation in the location of each 
firm. Each firm can locate at a point x (0≤x≤1). The location may represent a target market 
for a firm. The location differentiation implies that the target markets are separated apart 
with a certain distance. The other differentiation is in the product’s value to customers. For 
this differentiation, each firm may try to increase the intrinsic value of its product compared 
with other firm’s products. In our model, this differentiation in product value is assumed to 
be given such that firm 1 offers higher value than firm 2 (s1 > s2). 
We suppose that a consumer has to suffer a transportation cost in addition to the price 
in order to buy a product from a firm. The transportation cost may literally mean logistics 
cost or represent the disutility from the discrepancy of the consumer and the firm’s target 
market. We assume quadratic transportation costs. That is, a consumer living at the distance 
x from a firm incurs a transportation cost of tx2, where t is the unit transportation cost per 
squared distance. This quadratic transportation rather than linear is assumed for the sake of 
continuous market share change. And we also assume that the production cost for the goods 
is 0 without loss of generality.
In our paper, we first study the duopoly competition of two firms which are located at 
each extreme end of the linear city. And then we deal with the location problem as well.
In Shaked and Sutton (1982), three stage game was studied. In the first stage, firms decide 
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Figure 1. Linear City
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whether or not to enter the industry. In the second stage, each firm chooses the quality of its 
product. Then in the final stage, each firm chooses its price. They derive the proposition that 
the only perfect equilibrium is one in which exactly two firms enter; in which they produce 
distinct products, and earn positive profits at equilibrium. One of the key properties of their 
model reflects the effect of the lessening of price competition as qualities diverge.
II. Price Competition Model
First we consider the case where firm 1 is located at x = 0 and firm 2 at x = 1. That is, 
two firms are already maximally differentiated in location. In this case of fixed location, we 
study how the firms will compete with prices. The distinct point from Hotelling is that 
two firms offer goods with different intrinsic values to the consumers. A consumer who is 
indifferent between the two firms is located at x, where x is given by equating the total costs:
 s1 – p1 – tx
2 = s2 – p2 – t(1 – x)
2.
This equation implies that the consumer at x has the same residual value of buying either 
from firm 1 or firm 2. From the full market coverage assumption, we have sufficiently large (s1, 
s2) such that the residual values become non-negative. Denoting ∆s = s1 – s2, we can derive
 
∆ + − +
= 2 1 .
2
s p p t
x
t
And thus we have the demands of each firm as D1(p1, p2) = x and D2(p1, p2) = 1 – x.
In order for the demand functions to be valid, we need 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and this is equivalent 
to:
 p1 – t – ∆s ≤ p2 ≤ p1 + t – ∆s. (1)
We have the following profit functions of each firm:
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firm 1’s reaction function being ∆ + += 21 2( ) .2
s p t
R p  Likewise, we get 
−∆ + +
= 12 1( ) .2
s p t
R p  
The effective reaction functions should be adjusted by (1) and p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0.
1. Case where ∆s ≥ 3t
In this case, we have a monopoly by firm 1. The Nash equilibrium is (p1, p2) = (∆s – t, 
0), and the profits of each firm are (π1, π2) = (∆s – t, 0). The case where ∆s ≥ 3t means 
that we have a large amount of discrepancy in product value compared with the unit 
transportation cost. In this case, the firm producing goods with higher value dominates the 
market and the other firm gets 0 profit.
Considering the internet commerce, we note that the transaction costs including search 
costs, delivery time and costs, and so on decrease as the infrastructure develops. This means 
that the cost of a consumer purchasing from a firm far away is reduced. For example, using 
internet, we can easily find an on-line store with some distinct product and purchase the item 
with low delivery cost. These search and delivery costs are represented by the transportation 
cost t in our model. Therefore, in the internet commerce where the transportation cost 
decreases, the differentiated value of a product is rewarded to offer the monopoly. That is, 
we observe more frequently the phenomenon that the winner takes it all in the e-commerce 
markets.
2. Case where 0 < ∆s < 3t
In this case, we can derive the Nash equilibrium of ∆ ∆= + −1 2( , ) ( , )3 3
s sp p t t . And the 
consequent profits are π π ∆ ∆= + −1 2 2 21 1( , ) ( ( ) , ( ) )
2 3 2 3
s st t
t t
. We can note that firm 1 with 
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higher intrinsic product value has the privilege of charging higher price and enjoying higher 
profit than firm 2.
We can derive some implications from the outcome. From the Nash equilibrium prices, we 




sp p  That is the price premium for the better goods is ∆2
3
s , which is 
smaller than the difference of intrinsic values, ∆s. This phenomenon can be interpreted from 
the trade-off between two effects. One effect is from the higher profit margin for each unit. 
And this effect comes from the higher unit price. The other effect comes from larger market 
share. A firm can enlarge its market share by pricing lower. In our case, the optimal trade-off 
for firm 1 turns out to charge higher price than firm 2 but not as much as its incremental 
intrinsic value compared with firm 2. By not charging the whole increment of ∆s, firm 1 is 
better off from the larger demand of its own.
III. Location Model
In the previous section, we considered the case where the firms’ locations are predetermined 
such that maximal differentiation of location is given. Now we study the case where firms can 
determine their location. The model will consist of two stages. In the first stage, each firm 
determines its own location considering the other firm’s reaction. And then the firms wage 
price competition in the second stage. As well-known, we solve the model backwards. We 
solve the second stage problem. And then using the second stage outcome, we derive the first 
stage optimal solutions. 
The optimal location can be derived from the trade-off between two effects. One effect 
is from the higher profit margin for each unit. And this effect comes from the higher unit 
price. Higher prices are possible when the two firms are farther away and relax competition. 
The other effect comes from larger market share. A firm can enlarge its market share by 
locating near the center of the city and thus pricing lower. That is, the first effect makes the 
two firms be located far away from each other. And the other effect tries to locate the two 
firms near the center of the city.
Suppose that firm 1 is located at point 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and firm 2 at point 0 ≤ 1 – b ≤ 1. 
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Without loss of generality, we assume a ≤ 1 – b, that is a + b ≤ 1. This means that firm 
1 is on the left of firm 2 without loss of generality. Following the analysis of the previous 
section, we can derive the following demand functions.
 ( ) ( )








s p pa bD p p
t a b
 ( ) ( )








s p pb aD p p
t a b
And using the reaction functions, we can derive the Nash equilibrium in prices as follows.
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We should note that the Nash equilibrium above is the second stage outcome of the game. 
Using this equilibrium, we can solve the first stage problem of location. The special case of 
location would be the one where a = b = 0, which was dealt with in the previous section. 
As expected, the Nash equilibrium prices is 
∆ ∆
= + −1 2( , ) ( , )3 3
s sp p t t . In the first stage, firm 1 
should decide its location of a by trying to maximize the following reduced-form profit func-
tion:
 π =1 1 1 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , , ( , ), ( , ))
n n na b p a b D a b p a b p a b .
An equilibrium in location is such that firm 1 maximizes π1(a, b) with respect to a, taking 
b as given, and similarly for firm 2.
By utilizing the envelope theorem, we can derive the following:
 
π  ∂∂ ∂







n pD Dd p
da a p a
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We first deal with the location decision of firm 2 and analyze the second derivative above. 
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Therefore, we know that firm 2 will try to decrease b as much as possible. We thus get firm 
2’s optimal location becomes b = 0. That is, firm 2 chooses to locate at 1 – b = 1, the right 
most corner of the linear city. 
Using the fact that b* = 0, we now analyze to get the optimal location of firm 1. Suppose 
that firm 1 is located at a in the linear city.
Let x be the customer who is indifferent to purchasing from firm 1 or firm 2. Then the 
following equation should be held:
 − + − = − + −
2 2
1 1 2 2[ ( ) ] [ (1 ) ].s p t x a s p t x
                                0                                  a           x                1
Figure 2. Linear City with firm 1’s location of a
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Here we should note that x can be left of a. That is, the market share of firm 1 can be 
smaller than a depending on the pricing strategies of each firm.
 
∆ − + +
= +
−
1 2 1 .
2 (1 ) 2
s p p ax
t a
In order for this x can be valid, we need the condition of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. From this, we can 
derive the following inequality condition:
 2 2
1 2(1 ) .( )1s t a p p s t a∆ − − ≤ − ≤ ∆ + −  (2)
From the derivative of π1, we get the reaction function of firm 1 as follows:
 








p s a t
p p
Likewise, the reaction function of firm 2 becomes:
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From these two reaction functions, we can derive the Nash equilibrium prices as follows:
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For 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, the first inequality is trivially satisfied. And the second condition is effec-
tive with inducing the following range for a:
 ≤ − +2 1a k  (3)
Now using the Nash equilibrium, we can derive the profit function of firm 1:
 π + − −=
−
2 2






t k a aa
a
Thus we need to find the optimal a which maximizes + − −=
−
2 2( 3 2 )
( ) .
1
k a ag a
a
 Using the 
derivative
 




( 3 2 )( 1 2 3 )
( ) .
(1 )
k a a k a ag a
a
Figure 3. y = x2 + 2x - 3, y = -3x2 + 2x + 1
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= + −2 2 3y x x
 = − + +23 2 1y x x
The sign of g’(a) is the same as (k + 3 – 2a – a2)(k – 1 – 2a + 3a2). Let A(a) = k + 3 
– 2a – a2 and B(a) = k – 1 – 2a + 3a2. Denote a1 < a4 as the two solutions of A(a) = 0. 
And let a2 ≤ a3 be the two solutions of B(a) = 0. The next table shows the signs of A(a), 
B(a), and A(a)B(a) along the abscissa of a in each case. In case 1 where 40
3
k< ≤ , we have 
four real numbers of a1 < a2 ≤ a3 < a4. In case 2 where >
4
3
k , we have two solutions of a1 
< a4.
In case 1, the optimal a which maximizes g(a) is either 0 or 2 1 k− +  from (3). We 
should compare π1(a = 0) with π = − +1( 2 1 )a k  to determine which is bigger. We note that 
2
1 ( 3)( 0)
18
t kaπ += =  and π = − + = + −1( 2 1 ) 2 ( 1 1)a k t k . In case 1, we have compare π1(a = 
0) with π = − +1( 2 1 )a k . 
 π π+= = < = − + = + −
2
1 1( 3)( 0) ( 2 1 ) 2 ( 1 1)
18
t ka a k t k
 ↔ + < + −2 ( 3) 36( 1 1)k k
 ↔ + + − + <4 3 212 126 756 729 0k k k k
Table 1. Derivatives
Case 1 a1 a2 0 a3 1 a4
A(a) - 0 + + + + + 0 -
B(a) + + + 0 - 0 + + +
A(a)B(a) - 0 + 0 - 0 + 0 -
Case 2
A(a) - 0 +        + + + + 0 -
B(a) + + + + + + + + +
A(a)B(a) - 0 + + + + + 0 _
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 ↔ − + + − <3 2( 3)( 15 171 243) 0k k k k
 α↔ < < 3,k
where α is the only real number solution of k3 + 15k2 + 171k – 243 = 0 and α ≈ 1.26.
 y = x3 + 15x2 + 171x – 243
 y = x4 + 12x3 + 126x2 – 756x + 729
In case 2, we can see that g(a) is maximized at = − +* 2 1a k .
We therefore get the following outcome:
(1) For 0 ≤ k < α, we have duopoly with
Figure 4. y = x3 + 15x2 + 171x - 243
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 a* = 0,
 π
∆ ∆ +





, 0.5 0, ,
3 6 18









, 0.5 0, .
3 6 18
s k t sp t D
t
(2) For α ≤ k < 3, we have monopoly with
 = − +* 2 1 ,a k
 π= + − = = + −11 12 ( 1 1), 1, 2 ( 1 1),p t k D t k
  p2 = 0, D2 = 0, π
2 = 0.
(3) For 3 ≤ k, we have monopoly with
Figure 5. y = x4 + 12x3 + 126x2 - 756x + 729
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 a* = 0, 
 p1 = ∆s – t, D1 = 1, π
1 = ∆s – t,
 p2 = 0, D2 = 0, π
2 = 0.
IV. Interpretations and Extensions 
In cases of (1) and (2), we have a* = 0 but with different meaning. In case (1), we have 
a duopoly where two firms have positive market shares. However, in cases of (2) and (3), 
we have a monopoly by firm 1. In those cases, firm 2 does not have positive market share. 
In case (3), we have so much incremental value of ∆s that firm 1 is better off by taking the 
whole market even at the location of 0.
When the relative value of incremental value to transportation cost ( ∆= sk
t
) is less than 
α, firm 1 chooses to locate at 0 by utilizing the maximal differentiation from firm 2, which 
is located at 1. This maximal differentiation enables firm 1 to charge higher price due to 
less fierce competition between the two firms. However, when k increases such that α ≤ 
k < 3, firm 1 is better off by decreasing the differentiation from firm 2. That is, firm 1 
can get benefit by enlarging its market share by locating nearer to frim 2. But firm 1 does 
not eradicate firm 2 by locating at 1, since firm 1 also suffers by fierce competition. We 
should note that even in case 2 as k increases the location of firm 1 gets closer to 0, which 
differentiates further from firm 2. When the incremental value is sufficiently large, firm 
1 again goes back to location 0. In this case firm 1 derives the best outcome from higher 
pricing and drives out firm 2 from the market. 




. When k ≥ α (cases 2 and 3), only firm 1 prevails in the market, and we thus get 
monopoly. But this monopoly is sensitive in that firm 2 works as a potential entrant to the 
market. This potential effect is represented in k where intrinsic value of firm 2’s product, s2, 
is involved. This is different from the monopoly where only one firm exists in the market 
regardless of the parameters.
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When t decreases as in the e-commerce, we have larger k, and thus more chance of 
observing monopoly. In case 3 where we have huge value of k such that 3 ≤ k, firm 1 can 
be located at 0 of the maximal differentiation from the potential entrant, firm 2, at 1. Even 
at 0, firm 1 can maximize its profit repelling firm 2 from the market since it has so much 
incremental value. 
In all the cases, the price difference p1 – p2 is less than s1 – s2. That is, firm 1 is better off 
by making extra charge less than the whole difference of values compared with firm 2’s price. 
This comes from the fact that demand effect from lower price is larger than the price increase 
effect.
In our model, we assumed market coverage in the sense that all consumers in the linear city 
purchase a good either from firm 1 or from firm 2. Due to this assumption, the derivation of 
demand of each firm becomes simpler. There are two conditions for this. The first condition 
is that the customer x has non-negative residual utility by purchasing from firm 1:
 
 ∆ − + −








s p p as p t
t a
The other condition should be the extreme customer at 0 would want to buy from firm 1:
 s1 ≥ p1 + ta
2.
By utilizing the Nash equilibrium prices, we can derive that the market coverage 
assumption is valid on the area of (s1, s2), where ≥ + − − + − +−
2 2136 12( 3 2 ) ( 5 3)
1
s kk a a a
t a
 
and ≥ + − + 21
3
3 2 2
s k a a
t
. Roughly speaking, we need sufficiently large value of s1 compared 
with t other than the conditions on the incremental value of ∆s = s1 – s2. The first 
inequality comes from the condition that the critical customer at x has non-negative utility 
by purchasing from either firm. The other condition that customer at 0 should purchase 
from firm 1 is represented by the second inequality above. If we relax the market coverage 
condition, we have larger set of (s1, s2) for analysis.
Another possible extension of our model would be to study (s1, s2) as decision variables. 
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That is, each firm can choose the quality level of its goods associated with production cost 
of ci (si). Then we have to solve three stage games. A firm choose its quality level, and then 
choose the location, and finally choose the price. But in our model where s1 > s2 are given, 
we emphasized the fact that each firm produce distinct goods even though they seem to be 
homogeneous.
Even though homogeneous products are easier to analyze, we see heterogeneous product 
competition in general. Most products which are taken to be homogeneous are actually 
heterogeneous when we consider other attributes along with the products. For example, books 
are homogeneous, but they become heterogeneous when bookstores offer different delivery 
service or return policy. Therefore we need to analyze the competition for heterogeneous 
products. In our paper, heterogeneity is considered in (s1, s2) and location of the firm. 
From the outcome of our model, we can conclude that firms are better off by reducing the 
fierceness of competition when the comparative advantage of s1 – s2 is small. Otherwise when 
the comparative advantage of s1 – s2 is fairly large, the firm with higher value is better off by 
being a monopolist. And considering the comparative advantage of s1 – s2, we should note 
that its relative value with transportation cost t, 
−1 2s s
t
, is relevant. Therefore when making 
a decision, a firm should consider t as well as s1 – s2. The strategic implications of our model 
are as follows. A firm may try to increase its relative competitiveness, which is s1 – s2, by 
improving s1. Or a firm can choose optimal ‘distance’ from the enemy for mutual benefit. A 
firm can choose an optimal strategy considering the investment cost along with it.
V. Bertrand Competition and Location Decision of Firms with 
Different Intrinsic Values
Here we analyze the case where two firms are located at the same position. That is, the 
firms are not differentiated other than the fact that their products have different intrinsic 
values. We assume that the product of firm 1 has value of s1 to customers. Firm 2’s product 
has value of s2, and s1 > s2 is assumed. Assume that two firms are located at x = 0 in the 
linear city of length 1. 
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We first consider the Bertrand competition of two firms. Let us suppose that firm 1 charge 
some price p1. Then firm 2 will respond by pricing p2 = p1 – ∆s – ε for small ε. This price 
of p2 will give firm 2 the whole demand of firm 1. In reaction, firm 1 will reduce its price a 
little from p2 + ∆s, and get back the whole demand of firm 2. Following these processes of 
price cutting, in the Nash equilibrium we will have p2 = 0 and firm 2 will be extinct. And 
firm 1 will price less than or equal to ∆s in the Nash equilibrium. Now we can model the 
firm 1’s optimization model as follows. The marginal customer who would purchase from 
firm 1 is the x satisfying the equation:








. The optimization model would be




 s.t.  p ≤ ∆s = s1 – s2
Depending on whether s1 > t is satisfied, we can separate the above optimization into two 




(1) s1 > t
 −1Max  p s p
 s.t.  s1 – t ≤ p ≤ ∆s
(2) s1 ≤ t
 −1Max  p s p
 s.t.  0 ≤ p ≤ ∆s
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By squaring the objective function of (1), we can have equivalent optimization as follows:
(1′) s1 > t
 Max  m(p) ≡ p2(s1 – p) 
 s.t.  s1 – t ≤ p ≤ ∆s
From m′(p) = 0, we get = 12
3
sp . Therefore we can deal with three subcases:





s t s s s t
 p* = ∆s.














s s t s s s t
 p* = s1 – t.
Likewise, we can deal with two subcases of (2):









(2-2) − ≤ ≤11 2 1
2
 ,  
3
s
s s s t
 p* = ∆s.
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Figure 6. Three Cases
Case 1
Case 2 Case 3
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(3) Case 3: 0 ≤ s2 ≤ t, s1 > 3t
 p* = s1 – t, D1 = 1, π
1 = s1 – t.
We should note that in cases (1) and (2) the demand can be less than 1, which means that 
some customers do not purchase goods from either firm.
Taking into account b = 0, we consider π
1d
da
 to derive optimal location of firm 1, a. 
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. By substituting b = 0, we have
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 is equivalent to 
 
∆
< + −(3 1)(1 ).
s a a
t
Depending on the value of ∆s/t, we get the following optimal location of firm 1.
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(1) Case where ∆< ≤0 1 :
s
t
 a = 0.
























 a = 1.
We consider the first case where ∆< ≤0 1s
t
. From the graph, we know firm 1’s profit 
is maximized either at a = 0 or at a = 1. When we put a = 0, we get ∆= +1 3











 When we put a = 1, firm 1 
becomes a monopolist with pricing ∆=1 .3
sp  And the profit becomes π ∆=1 .
3
s  By comparing 
those two profit functions, we can show that
 
 + + > 
 
1 (3 ) 2 .
3
k k k
Therefore, the optimal location for firm 1 becomes a* = 0 in the first case.
The most interesting case is (2). We will analyze the case in detail. Denoting ∆ = ,s k
t
 the 
equation (3a + 1)(1 – a) = k has two solutions. From the sign of π
1d
da
, the optimal location 
a should be either the smaller solution or 1. The smaller solution is α − −= 1 4 3 .
3
k
 We can 
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 Ick-Hyun Nam 149
 
α
− − − − −
−∆ + − +
=
= − ∆ + + −
2







k k ks t
p









( ) ( )1 2(4 4 3 )
( )
2 2 (1 ) 9
n ns p p kD
t
Therefore we get π α − −= + + −1 7 16 16 8 4 1 3( ) ( 1 3 ) .
9 27 27 9
kt k k  And we need to compare 
this with π ∆=1(1) .
3
s
 We check whether the following inequality is satisfied.
 
− − + + − > 
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4 16 8 2(4 4 3 )
4 3
9 27 27 9 3
k kk k
This is equivalent to
 + + − − >63 64 8(4 3 ) 4 3 0k k k




 we know that 4 – 3k > 0. Thus, the inequality above is clearly satisfied. 
Therefore we get the optimal location of firm 1 as a* = α.
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